Classical versus hellenistic philosophy

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Classical versus hellenistic philosophy

Postby Quintus Pomponius Atticus on Tue Jun 01, 2004 2:47 pm

Salvete philosophi,

It is often repeated in introductions to Greek philosophy that the fundamental difference between classical and hellenistic philosophy is the fact that the focus of the philosophers moved from the well-being of the polis to the happiness of the individual.

Reading G. Lowes Dickinson’s “The Greek View of Life”, I came to realise there was another, perhaps even more fundamental difference, being in the changed concept of virtue itself. Instead of rewording the whole chapter for you, I will simply quote its conclusion, which more or less summarizes Dickinson's point, below.

Those who would like to read the entire chapter (or the whole book), I refer to the http://www.gutenberg.net/etext04/tgeev10.txt Project Gutenberg site, where the complete work can be downloaded (it was written in 1896, so copyright has long expired). The chapter in question is "Section 5. Greek Ethics--Identification of the Aesthetic and Ethical Points of View."

Even from this passage, in spite of its dualistic hypothesis, but far more clearly from the whole tenor of his work, we may perceive that Plato's description of virtue as an "order" of the soul is prompted by the same conception, characteristically Greek, as Aristotle's account of virtue as a "mean." The view, as we said at the beginning, is properly aesthetic rather than moral. It regards life less as a battle between two contending principles, in which victory means the annihilation of the one, the altogether bad, by the other, the altogether good, than as the maintenance of a balance between elements neutral in themselves but capable, according as their relations are rightly ordered or the reverse, of producing either that harmony which is called virtue, or that discord which is called vice. Such being the conception of virtue characteristic of the Greeks, it follows that the motive to pursue it can hardly have presented itself to them in the form of what we call the "sense of duty." For duty mphasises self-repression. Against the desires of man it sets a law of prohibition, a law which is not conceived as that of his own complete nature, asserting against a partial or disproportioned development the balance and totality of the ideal, but rather as a rule imposed from without by a power distinct from himself, for the mortification, not the perfecting, of his natural impulses and aims. Duty emphasises self-repression; the Greek view emphasised self-development. That "health and beauty and good habit of the soul," which is Plato's ideal, is as much its own recommendation tion to the natural man as is the health and beauty of the body. Vice, on this view, is condemned because it is a frustration of nature, virtue praised because it is her fulfilment; and the motive throughout is simply that passion to realise oneself which is commonly acknowledged as sufficient in the case of physical development, and which appeared sufficient to the Greeks in the case of the development of the soul.


Any thoughts on this ? Or any other hypotheseses on this subject ?

Valete,

Q. Pomponius Atticus
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Postby Quintus Pomponius Atticus on Tue Jun 01, 2004 7:34 pm

Salvete,

It is quite odd to reply to one of my own postings, but perhaps we could extend the discussion I wished to start on this subject to the influences of classical upon hellenistic philosophy, instead of treating only the differences.

Take for example the following excerpt from Plato's Republic :

“And in order not to argue in the dark, shall we first define our distinction between necessary and unnecessary appetites ?” “Let us do so.” “Well, then, desires that we cannot divert or suppress may be properly called necessary, and likewise those whose satisfaction is beneficial to us, may they not? For our nature compels us to seek their satisfaction. Is not that so ?” “Most assuredly.” “Then we shall rightly use the word ‘necessary’ of them?” “Rightly.” “And what of the desires from which a man could free himself by discipline from youth up, and whose presence in the soul does no good and in some cases harm? Should we not fairly call all such unnecessary?” “Fairly indeed.” “Let us select an example of either kind, so that we may apprehend the type. ” “Let us do so.” “Would not the desire of eating to keep in health and condition and the appetitefor mere bread and relishes be necessary?” “I think so.” “The appetite for bread is necessary in both respects, in that it is beneficial and in that if it fails we die.” “Yes.” “And the desire for relishes, so far as it conduces to fitness?” “By all means.” “And should we not rightly pronounce unnecessary the appetite that exceeds these and seeks other varieties of food, and that by correction and training from youth up can be got rid of in most cases and is harmful to the body and a hindrance to the soul's attainment ofintelligence and sobriety?” “Nay, most rightly.” “And may we not call the one group the spendthrift desires and the other the profitable,because they help production?” “Surely.” “And we shall say the same of sexual and other appetites?” “The same.” “And were we not saying that the man whom we nicknamed the drone is the man who teems with such pleasures and appetites, and who is governed by his unnecessary desires, while the one who is ruledby his necessary appetites is the thrifty oligarchical man?” “Why, surely.” (Politeia, 558d-559d)


Does this not seem to be the inspiration for Epicurus' famous words :

"And we must consider that some of the passions are natural, and some empty; and of the natural ones some are necessary, and some merely natural. And of the necessary ones, some are necessary to happiness, and others, with regard to the exemption of the body from trouble; and others with respect to living itself; for a correct theory, with regard to these things, can refer all choice and avoidance to the health of the body and the freedom from disquietude of the soul. (Letter to Menoikeus)"


There must be other instances as well that clearly show the continuity between the classical and the hellenistic period in philosophy. I don't know if anyone here knows of other conspicuous examples ?

Valete,

Q. Pomponius Atticus
Quintus Pomponius Atticus
Praetor

"Ars longa, vita brevis" - Hippocrates
Quintus Pomponius Atticus
Senator
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Posts: 500
Joined: Wed Aug 28, 2002 6:03 pm
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